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ABSTRACT
From the perspective of the classical dichotomy between the main paradigms of international 
law and relations – particularism, on the one hand, and universalism on the other – the right to 
seek refuge in view of a significant threat against the fundamental conditions of a decent life, 
and the right to preserve the always fragile identity of the political community, seem to be hope-
lessly irreconcilable. While the supporters of the particularistic understanding of international 
order claim the unquestionable superiority of the identity of the individual political community, 
the advocates of universalism decidedly promote the right to seek asylum without consideration 
of national borders. Yet, on both sides of the apparent dichotomy things are not as definite as 
they seem to be at first glance. In fact, not every parochialism is insensitive to the rights of “oth-
ers”, and cosmopolitanism has to acknowledge that rights should be regarded as differentiated 
insofar as they refer to rights-holders in different situations. Building on this potential rapproche-
ment – and, therefore, on the overcoming of the classical dichotomy between particularism and 
universalism – a framework is developed for the recognition of the right of aliens to refuge which, 
nevertheless, also presupposes that citizens justifiably hold a “thicker” endowment of rights than 
strangers. On this basis, the following questions are addressed: a) what are the justifiable specific 
rights of citizens that make them different from aliens? b) What is entailed in the right to refuge? 
c) Under which conditions can a right to refuge be claimed? d) And, on the contrary, when is it 
justified to deny the right to cross borders in the name of preserving the integrity of the political 
community?  
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We can define the identity of a political community as the internalization, in the form of ethical 
habits, of the rules which guarantee a peaceful and cooperative social interaction. These rules are 
made of two components: a logical nucleus and a historical realization. The logical nucleus is uni-
versal and refers to the inescapable conditions of a meaningful communication.1 But, since this 
nucleus is always embedded in concrete historical conditions, the fundamental question at the ba-
sis of every political community – regarding the principles on which we want to organize our life in 
its public dimension –2 has been answered in quite different ways. Factually, the distinct answers 
are the result of specific historical events and of social struggles – we could say: of “struggles for 
recognitions” –3 that shaped the unique identity of every political community. Therefore – and as 
a matter of fact – the actual identity of a political community is always the result of the substitu-
tion of former rules of interaction through new ones, so that political identity is necessarily des-
tined not to last forever – and probably not even for long – but to change from time to time, at 
more or less short intervals. Nevertheless, it is understandable that a large part of the political 
community is rather prone to maintain the existing rules, first because of the unshaken belief by 
the majority of its members in the values embedded in them, second due to the predictability of 
interaction that is guaranteed by the internalization of the given rules, and third as a consequence 
of the awareness that a change of the existing rules comes always along with a great amount of 
suffering and of uncertainties about the future.  
On the other hand, the right to refuge, or to seek asylum, is the entitlement by every human 
being to escape from situations which represent an existential threat or do not guarantee a decent 
quality of life, to be supported in her/his attempt by her/his fellow humans, and to be welcomed 
in foreign countries as long as the danger persists. If we consider the right to political identity and 
the right to refuge each from its own perspective, both entitlements seem to be self-evident: the 
right to political identity because it is part of the day-to-day experience of most of us, and the right 
to refuge because it is based on the most essential and intuitive entitlement that we mutually rec-
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ognize to everyone of us, namely the right to protect our lives.4 Nevertheless, in reality – and, spe-
cifically, in the present situation of the Western world – they are increasingly seen as trapped in a 
mutual contradiction and eventually excluding each other: if the right to political identity has to be 
taken seriously, the right to refuge should be at least limited as a second-level entitlement or 
downright ignored; and, instead, if the right to refuge should be put to the fore, the identity of the 
community runs the risk of being regarded as a selfish and backward-oriented bias. What is hap-
pening in the last years in the European Union – but, in general, not only there, and not exclusively 
in the Western world − as regards the attitude towards migrants gives us a disturbing example of 
the consequences that can arise from an unbalanced and largely one-sided approach to the ques-
tion. 
The seemingly irresolvable contradiction can be traced back to the inherent relation that 
each of the rights has to one of the two main paradigms of international law and relations: while 
the conviction that gives priority to the right to political identity arises from a particularistic view 
of social order, according to which only limited communities with undisputable distinctiveness can 
be well-ordered, the precedence to the right to refuge presupposes, on the contrary, the univer-
salistic persuasion that order can be expanded to the whole cosmopolis. Insofar as particularism 
and universalism are assumed to build a dichotomy,5 also the seemingly insoluble contrast be-
tween the right to political identity and the right to refuge appears to be easily explained: as in all 
dichotomies, the preference for the one option excludes per se the other possibility. Thus, from 
the standpoint of the traditional dichotomy of particularism and universalism, the state of things is 
assumed to be quite unambiguous. The supporters of the particularistic understanding of interna-
tional order claim the unquestionable superiority of the identity of the individual political commu-
nity, while the advocates of universalism decidedly promote the right to seek asylum, in front of a 
significant threat against the fundamental conditions of a decent life, without consideration of na-
tional borders. The two approaches appear to be rooted in no less clear-cut – and opposite – ideas 
of rationality and of the use of practical reason. On the one hand, particularism is backed by an id-
iosyncratic conception of rationality as strictly related to the vernacular communication, to the 
specific conditions of social interaction and to the interests of an individual community; on the 
other hand, universalism relies on the conviction that rationality is intrinsically not bound to any 
form of exclusive identity, thus leading every human being to the shared recognition of common 
rights and interests and, therefore, to a cosmopolitan obligation to basic solidarity (2.).  
Yet, on both sides of the dichotomy things are not as definite as they seem to be at first 
glance. In fact, not every parochialism is insensitive against the rights of “others”, and cosmopoli-
tanism – if it does not want to verge on the utopia of the civitas maxima – has to acknowledge 
that rights should be regarded as differentiated insofar as they refer to rights-holders in different 
situations (3.). Starting from this assumption, a framework is developed for the recognition of the 
right of aliens to refuge which, nevertheless, also presupposes that citizens justifiably hold a 
“thicker” endowment of rights than strangers. As a result, the conceptual presuppositions are giv-
en to overcome the former dichotomy, so that the right to refuge has not to be seen as irreconcil-
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able with the centrality of the political identity of the individual community any longer. Many es-
sential questions related to the contemporary debate concerning social order and international 
justice can hardly find an adequate solution within the horizon of the dichotomy between particu-
larism and universalism – and, therefore, also between the rights to political identity and to ref-
uge. Among them are such fundamental issues as the identification of the specific rights of citizens 
that make them different from aliens; the definition of what is entailed in the right to refuge and 
of those who are entitled to claim this right; as well as, finally, the conditions under which it may 
be justified to deny the right to cross borders in the name of the integrity of the political commu-
nity. On the basis of a post-dichotomous conceptual framework these problems can be ap-
proached from an unusual standpoint: by being reassessed, they are likely to be brought closer to 




2. The Contradiction between the Right to Political Identity and the Right to Refuge as an Expres-
sion of the Dichotomy between Particularism and Universalism 
 
Particularism and universalism are the two preeminent paradigms of international law and rela-
tions. The difference between the paradigms concerns essentially the potential extension of a 
well-ordered society. Theories of social order which can be ascribed to the particularistic paradigm 
maintain that a society has to be regarded as well-ordered – i.e. as a society characterized by ef-
fective rules of interaction, which guarantee peaceful and cooperative relations between its mem-
bers – only if its extension remains limited and the population involved is rather homogeneous. By 
contrast, universalistic theories of social order assume that the well-ordered society could be ex-
panded to comprehend, at least potentially, the whole world and the entire humankind. 
According to the tradition of political and legal thought, particularism and universalism are 
supposed to radically oppose each other, or, in other words, to build a dichotomy, which has two 
consequences. First, the preference for particularism excludes in principle any advocacy in favour 
of admitting an even just marginal consistency of universalistic arguments, and vice versa. As a re-
sult, the opposite position is not seen as possibly containing elements capable of being integrated 
into one’s own convictions. Rather, it is regarded as an irreconcilable alternative – if not even as 
the unacceptable claim of the political and ideological counterpart. Secondly, every theory of or-
der belongs necessarily to one camp, or to the other: no overlapping or merging is conceivable. 
At first glance, it seems to be evident that affirming the centrality of the right to political 
identity – as opposite to the marginality or irrelevance of the right to seek asylum − is an expres-
sion of the belief in the particularistic view. Indeed, the strenuous defence of the identity of one’s 
own political community always presupposes the conviction that the individual community is the 
privileged place to realize a well-ordered society, and a deeply rooted scepticism towards the uni-
versalization of order. On the other hand, defending the right to refuge mirrors the universalistic 
Weltanschauung and the rejection of any form of narrow-minded parochialism. As a result, if par-
ticularism and universalism are opposite to each other as a dichotomy, then the right to political 
identity and the right to seek asylum − insofar as they belong respectively to one of the conflicting 
paradigmatic frameworks – will also exclude each other. 
Starting from this assumption, the supporters of the right to political identity present argu-
ments derived from the conceptual organon of particularism in order to back their option and to 
oppose the centrality of the right to seek refuge. Analogously, but on the other side, the partisans 
of the right to refuge argue by resorting to the classical universalistic reasons. Both strands of ar-
gumentation will be considered more in detail in the following sections.  
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2.1. Particularism and the Right to Political identity 
 
Particularism – and, therefore, also the strand of political and legal thought that prioritizes the 
right to political identity by resorting to particularistic arguments – is characterized by a specific 
form of rationality, in particular with regard to the use of practical reason. Three features are typi-
cal for the particularistic rationality: a) cultural and linguistic embeddedness of reason; b) selfish-
ness as rational choice; c) contraposition to alleged external threats as expression of rational be-
haviour. Most authors who can be related to the particularistic understanding of order preferen-
tially address in their works only one of these characteristics, so that different variants of the par-
adigm can be distinguished.6 Nevertheless, we can also find out a significant merging of the dis-
tinct positions in some recent theories (d). 
a) Western thought generally interpreted rationality as essentially abstract, since based 
mainly on logical procedures of reasoning, and universal. In other words, reason was supposed to 
be one and the same in all human beings and not to be rooted in pre-rational lifeworlds. The be-
ginning of the abstract approach to knowledge can be probably traced back as far as to Plato,7 or 
even further to Parmenides.8 However, no doubts can arise on the fact that it was significantly 
radicalized by modern rationalism and enlightenment.9 The emerging of an ever more abstract 
and universalistic conception of reason raised a counterreaction during the 18th century. First, as 
we can see in Giambattista Vico’s Scienza Nuova, the use of practical reason – i.e. the exercise of 
reason which does not aim at achieving a theoretical knowledge of the world, but at giving rules to 
subjective and intersubjective action – was explicitly linked to the historical and social conditions 
of human life.10 Secondly – and with a significantly more deep-going impact – rational thinking as 
the distinct feature that characterizes the human species was directly connected to the develop-
ment of human language by Johann Gottfried Herder.11 Yet, human language was not interpreted, 
here, as a logical instrument with the function to build abstract concepts for the theoretical and 
practical use of reason, but as a semantic tool to allow communication.12 Moreover, human lan-
guage was understood as something deeply tied with concrete and tangible experiences not only 
because it was seen as non-abstract but also insofar as it was regarded as non-universal. In fact, 
human language – and, therefore, also human reason – is always the language of an individual 
community, of a specific nation or people (Volk).13 Since the national languages are assumed to be 
                                                          
6  We can speak, respectively, of a nationalistic, a realistic and a hegemonic variant of particularism. See: Sergio 
Dellavalle, The Necessity of International Law Against the A-normativity of Neo-Conservative Thought, in: Russell 
Miller, Rebecca Bratspies (eds.), Progress in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston 2008, 95, at 105 
et seq. 
7  Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927), Niemeyer, Tübingen 1986, at 2 et seq. 
8  Michael Theunissen, Negative Theologie der Zeit, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, at 89 et seq. I am grateful to 
Eva Birkenstock for this suggestion. 
9  René Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, Ian Maire, Leyde 1637; René Descartes, Meditationes de Prima Philoso-
phia, Amsterdam 1642 (1st ed. 1641) ; Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (1640), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1994, Part I, Chapter I; Hobbes, De Cive, supra note 4, Part I, Chapter II, I ; John Locke, An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Prometheus, New York 1995; David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature (1739), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2000; Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), 
in : Immanuel Kant, Werkausgabe, Wilhelm Weischedel ed., Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1977, Vol. III and IV. 
10  Giambattista Vico, Princìci di scienza nuova d’intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni (1744), in: Giambattista 
Vico, Opere filosofiche, Sansoni, Firenze 1971, 377 et seq., at 379, 466. 
11  Johann Gottfried Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, Reclam, Stuttgart 1997, at 29 et seq., 108 
et seq. 
12  Ib., at 129 et seq. 
13  Ib., at 141 et seq. 
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intrinsically divisive,14 the limits of a meaningful communication must coincide with the borders of 
the nation. Furthermore, because according to political romanticism no rationality is admitted 
which could claim to be valid beyond the boundaries of the Volk, the only rational action will be 
the one that serves the interests of the nation.15 
Under the premise that rationality is essentially bound to the nation, also political communi-
cation – as the kind of rationality that aims at organizing the life of the community as well as at 
working out its principles – is assumed to unfold properly, insofar as it claims to be rational, only 
within the context of the language of the Volk. In particular, according to the interpretation pro-
posed by Dieter Grimm, only the existence of a shared language enables the members of the polit-
ical community to legitimate the institutions of public power as well as their decisions.16 As a re-
sult, if the ethical quality of the political life is regarded as strictly connected to the language of the 
people and the democratic legitimation of power depends on the presence of a common linguistic 
heritage, it would be a duty for every true supporter of democracy to slow down the pace of the 
development of society towards a multicultural and plurilinguistic entity and, therefore, to curb 
the number of incoming people in search for shelter.  
b) The second feature of particularistic rationality is expressed by the assertion that only 
egoistic behaviour would be really rational. An evidence and an assumption lie at the basis of this 
conviction. The evidence is that the defence of one’s own life and, if possible, the improvement of 
one’s own life condition are to be seen as the highest commands that lead our actions; the as-
sumption, instead, is that the behaviour of other actors can always be a threat to our lives or, at 
least, to our well-being. As a consequence of the individual priorities and of the dangers that they 
are always facing, it can be said – according to this approach – that I am acting rationally only in 
the case that I pursue my own benefit with indifference towards the interests of other, or even 
against them. The idea that reason would command the pursuit of self-interest – contesting, thus, 
the belief in universal justice – is nothing new in Western thought. Rather, it can be traced back to 
the very beginning of Western rationalism, as stated by Plato in his Republic, where the Sophist 
Thrasymachus is reported to explicitly assert that “justice … is the interest of the stronger.”17 In 
the same spirit, but even a couple of decades earlier, Thucydides let the Athenian ambassadors 
reply to the Melian magistrates, who had claimed the superiority of justice over power-oriented 
selfishness, with the contemptuous remark that “we bless your innocent minds, but affect not 
your folly.”18 Surely, according to Plato, Socrates successfully rebuffed Thrasymachus’ argument 
by strongly affirming the priority of an idea of justice based on common interests. Moreover, be-
tween the end of antiquity and the beginning of Modern Ages Thucydides’ power-oriented and 
egoistic understanding of rationality faded even more into the background in the face of an ap-
proach which sought universalistic order and, at least in the Christian message, final salvation in 
the afterlife. Yet, at the dawn of modernity, the resort to mundane selfishness as the only rational 
behavioural pattern became powerful again in the political philosophy of Machiavelli. Explicit is 
the passage of his Prince, in which he states – in a Thucydides-like manner – that “a man who 
wants to practice goodness in all situations is inevitably destroyed, among so many men who are 
not good.”19 
                                                          
14  Ib., at 146 et seq. 
15  As regards the concepts of “nation“, national identity and the definition of national interests in political romanti-
cism, see: Adam Müller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst (1809), Fischer, Jena 1922. 
16  D. Grimm, Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?, 50 JuristenZeitung 581 (1995), at 588. 
17  Plato, The Republic, Collier, New York 1901, Book I, 338c. 
18  Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. By Thomas Hobbes, Rutgers Press, New Brunswick (New Jersey) 1975, 
Book V, 105, at 382. 
19  Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe (1513), Einaudi, Torino 1995, Chapter XV (English transl. by James b. Atkinson, 
Hackett, Indianapolis 1976, at 257). 
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Machiavelli is regarded as the founder of modern political science, so that it is not surprising 
that his understanding of political rationality as aiming at maximizing the payoffs of the single 
agent has profoundly shaped the so-called realism – one of the most influential epistemological 
patterns of political science and philosophy, and probably the most influential of all with regard to 
the theory of international relations.20 Finally, slightly more than a decade ago, Jack L. Goldsmith 
and Eric A. Posner have applied the epistemological framework of rational choice – based on the 
assumption that only selfishness is rational – to legal theory in order to assert the normative limits 
of international law.21 According to their interpretation, since we cannot know precisely what the 
preferences of other polities are or what their next actions are going to be, we will act rationally – 
i.e. we will enhance our payoffs – only if our polity does not bind itself to strict supra-state rules, 
or, if it does so, just in the case that these rules are evidently at the service of its immediate inter-
ests. 
By shifting the tools of the rational choice theory from the field of individual decisions, for 
which it was developed, to the actions of collective actors, namely of states,22 Goldsmith and Pos-
ner run the risk – as realism does in general, insofar as it shares the same approach –  of falling in-
to an epistemological shortcoming. Still, let us leave aside the question of the epistemological def-
icit that may occur when individual and collective actors are supposed to have the same ontologi-
cal features and are analyzed, therefore, with the same conceptual framework – and let us simply 
consider the practical consequences that the application of the selfish pattern of rationality has for 
the acknowledgement of a right to refuge. And these consequences cannot but be highly negative. 
Indeed, if the only rational behavior consists in pursuing the highest individual interest of the polit-
ical community, foreigners will be sheltered exclusively in the case that their inclusion will bring an 
advantage, if not for every member of the polity, at least for most of them, or for the polity as a 
whole. 
c) The third feature of particularistic rationality identifies rational behaviour not positively, 
but negatively, i.e. not starting from the definition of values and interests that bind the members 
of the community and are shared by them all, but on the basis of existential threats coming from 
outside.23 In this case, priority lies in the identification of the enemy who endangers the very ex-
istence of one’s own community. As a result, the friend will be everyone who shares the same 
danger and, therefore, also the same enemy. Not the organization of the polity, with the task of 
improving the life conditions of its members, is the barycentre of politics, but the defence against 
the threatening “others”, whereas these “others” can be characterized by the most different fea-
tures. They only need to be perceived as aliens, no matter whether their otherness has an ethnic, 
cultural, religious, social, or political basis. 
Doubtlessly, this is the most radical feature of particularistic rationality and characterizes the 
most ungenerous attitude towards the inclusion of aliens. Indeed, if the community is always in 
danger of being destroyed and the danger comes in the most cases from outside, then those who 
are seeking refuge are to be identified – at first – as possible threats. This is true, by the way, re-
gardless of their behavior or ideological affiliation: being different, they are a danger per se, and 
no inclusive policy can offer – according to this approach – a convincing solution. 
d) The three features of particularistic rationality are perfectly synthetized in Samuel Hun-
tington’s book Who Are We?. The starting point of Huntington’s analysis is the claim that the iden-
                                                          
20  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knopf, New York 1954; Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, London 1979. 
21  Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 
2005.  
22  Ib., at 6. 
23  Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (1932), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1963, at 20 et seq. 
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tity of a political community always entails a sort of distinctiveness. In other words, in order to 
know what it is, a nation has always to put itself against an “other”,24 and Huntington goes so far 
in his assertion as to say that the “other” has to be explicitly perceived as an “enemy”.25 This as-
sumption is backed by a short overview of the US history which is presumed to have been essen-
tially characterized by the continuous presence of existential threats, although these threats may 
have changed during the course of time. As far as the near future is concerned, then, it is to be ex-
pected – according to Huntington – that the American identity will be largely shaped by the strug-
gle against Chinese nationalism and militant Islamism.26 The second point is Huntington’s convic-
tion that the so-called American Creed – namely the broad internalization of principles such as 
“liberty, equality, democracy, civil rights, non-discrimination, rule of law” –27 is by far too abstract 
to forge a nation.28 As a result, the American people, so as not to lose its cohesion and identity, 
should go back to its roots and revitalize its Anglo-Protestant heritage, which is seen as the crucial 
basis of the values that shaped the distinctiveness of the American people.29 Thus, insofar as a mi-
gration influx occurs in which the immigrants are not willing to take on the leading values of the 
hosting society – as Huntington assumes to be true for the Mexican immigration of the last dec-
ades – the strength and the very future of the nation is in danger.30 Finally, given these premises, 
rational politics cannot but consist in defending the – actually selfish – interests of the individual 
nation and, without any consideration of the possible existence of an inherent right to refuge, in 
welcoming the influx of migrants only insofar as it can be regarded as immediately advantageous 
for the hosting people. 
Concluding, if we accept a particularistic understanding of rationality, according to which ra-
tional behaviour is culturally and even ethnically idiosyncratic, short-term-focused on egoistic 
payoffs and always scared of the possible danger coming from the “other”, the identity of the po-
litical community can only be re-affirmed – in a somehow oppressive narrow-minded perspective 
– at the high price of a substantial denial of the right of persecuted people to find shelter. Insofar 
as this right, in a very limited sense, should be accepted, it would always and generally be submit-
ted to the priorities of the hosting nation. 
 
 
2.2. Universalism and the Right to Refuge 
 
While particularistic rationality is culturally embedded, egoistic and suspicious towards strangers, 
if not downright hostile against them, universalistic rationality is culturally neutral – and thus cos-
mopolitan –, rather altruistic and open to the needs of the “others” as well as to their inclusion. 
Indeed, the idea of humanity including all human beings is a relatively recent invention in the his-
tory of humankind. And, to be developed, it needed a new understanding of the capacities and 
tasks of human reason. 
In Greek and Roman antiquity, the full use of rationality was regarded to have been 
achieved, both in theoretical and in practical sense, only by civilized peoples, actually by no one 
else but the Greeks and Romans themselves. Since rationality was essentially linked to argumenta-
tion, it was not seen as the objective essence of the world, but rather as a capacity which could be 
                                                          
24  Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, Simon & Schuster, New York 
2004, at 24 et seq. 
25  Ib., at 258 et seq.; 357 et seq. 
26  Ib., at 340. 
27  Ib., at 338. 
28  Ib., at 19, 337 et seq. 
29  Ib., at 37 et seq. 
30  Ib., at 221 et seq. 
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displayed only within civilized societies and, in their context, just by the sages as the most cultivat-
ed individuals. As a result, the only features that were assumed to be shared by all humans were 
the main characteristics of their physical constitution and, to some extent, a general tendency to 
sociability. Moreover, from this tendency no universal nomos or law could be drawn; rather, every 
political community was considered to have its specific nomos, whereas the different nomoi were 
not only independent of each other but also, the more distant the communities were in cultural 
sense, largely incommensurable. 
It was first with the Stoic philosophy that the idea of a universal rationality made its entry in-
to Western cultural history.31 The Stoic conception of rationality had three dimensions. First, the 
Stoics claimed that the logos governs the whole world, in both its material and spiritual compo-
nents. Thus, the logos was regarded as the fundament not only of the laws of the physical matter 
but also of the rules of the moral, social and political world. Secondly – and as a consequence of 
the first assumption – from the universal logos a no less universal nomos was derived as a law 
which embodied the fundamental principles of the worldwide human society. Thirdly, the nomoi 
of the individual social and political communities were based, at least implicitly, on the universal 
nomos and took their legitimacy from this. Within this conceptual framework and due to the uni-
versal human sociability (οικέιωσις), every human being could − and had to − be seen as a κόσμου 
πολίτης, a “citizen of the world”.32 Here lies – according to the scholarship −33 the very first source 
of the philosophical concept of “cosmopolitanism”. Yet – with the relative exception of a certain 
influence on the idea of a “universal monarchy” during the reign of Alexander the Great and the 
following Hellenistic tradition, as well as in the time of the Roman Empire – the impact of the Stoic 
vision on the real world was, in fact, rather marginal. What made Stoic cosmopolitanism as well as 
the concept of “natural law”, which had been developed within the same philosophical context, 
highly influential on the political and intellectual history of the following centuries was the fact 
that many of the Stoic ideas − and, in particular, cosmopolitanism and natural law – were adopted 
by the nascent Christian philosophy. 
As testified by the commandment to the missio ad gentes, which implies the duty to spread 
the Christian Gospel universally, the cosmopolitan vocation of Christendom was unequivocal from 
the very beginning.34 The communitas christiana was thus conceived of as including, at least po-
tentially, the whole humankind, without any restraint due to the different cultural or ethnic be-
longings of the individuals. After the Christian religion became politically dominant in the Western 
world, the question arose on how its universalism could be conveyed into an adequate institution-
al and legal frame. Two variants of the idea of an ethical, political and legal order of universal 
scope were developed: a first one in which political power was located under the aegis of the pa-
pacy and legitimated by this;35 and a second one, in which political power took the form of a uni-
versal monarchy with autonomous legitimacy.36 In the first case the guarantor of the universal 
scope of order was the pope; in the second the emperor. 
                                                          
31  Johannes von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Teubneri, Lipsiae 1905, Vol. I, at 85; Vol. I, at 98; Vol. III, 
at 4; Vol. III, at 323. 
32  According to Diogenes Laertius the terminus was used for the first time by Diogenes of Sinope: Diogenes 
Laertius, Vitae philosophorum, Clarendon, Oxford 1964, Book VI, 63. See also: Otfried Höffe, Demokratie im Zeit-
alter der Globalisierung, Beck, München 2002 (1st ed. 1999), at 234. 
33  Martha C. Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, in: 5 The Journal of Political Philosophy 1 (1997). 
34  The Holy Bible, New Testament, Matthew, 28, 19; Acts, Chapter 2. 
35  Henricus Hostiensis, Summa Aurea (1250–1261), Servanius, Lugduni 1556. In a more moderate form, we can find 
the idea of the spiritual origin of all mundane power also in: Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica [1265–1273], 
W. Benton-Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago 1980, Part II, Section II, Question 12, Article 2; Thomas Aqui-
nas, Political Writings, R. W. Dyson ed., Cambridge University press, Cambridge/New York 2004, at 278. 
36  Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia (1310–1314), in: Dante Alighieri, Opere minori, Vol. II, Utet, Torino 1986. Although 
independent of the spiritual power as regards the source of legitimacy, the authority of the emperor was never-
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Two significant changes occurred at the beginning of the 16th century. First, both pillars of 
universal order – the authority of the papacy, and that of the emperor – which, in fact, had already 
been trembling for a long time, collapsed definitively. The pillar that broke down first was the idea 
of the universal power of the Holy Roman Empire: though never a realistic option, it was not ex-
plicitly abandoned by the most influential political and legal philosophers until the beginning of 
Modern Ages. Since the late Middle Ages the state of things was better described, indeed, by the 
Latin phrase according to which rex in regno suo est imperator,37 than by the abstract pretension 
to universal authority by the emperor. Nevertheless, even if the real power in Europe was already 
recognized as belonging factually to the territorial kings, a higher prerogative was still acknowl-
edged to the emperor through the assumption of the so-called translatio imperii. Hereby he was 
assumed to possess, if not real authority in front of the territorial kings of Europe, at least higher 
political dignity and – what mattered most – an original imperium as regards the newly discovered 
territories.38 For the explicit rejection of this claim – and for the recognition that the emperor is 
only the sovereign of its own limited territory and population – it was necessary to wait until the 
first half of the 16th century.39 Francisco de Vitoria, namely the author who openly contested the 
theory of the emperor as “the lord of the whole world”, shook also the second pillar of medieval 
universalism, i.e. the assumption that the pope is “the civil or temporal lord of the whole world.”40 
For the first time in the history of Christian political thought, one of the outstanding thinkers of his 
time – maybe the most relevant of all – asserted that the pope has spiritual authority only over 
Christian believers. 
Thus, at the beginning of Modern Ages universalism had been deprived of both its former 
foundations. As a result, since the idea of universal order could not rely on political, legal or reli-
gious authority any longer, it had to be based on a different, purely abstract source – and natural 
law was identified as the best solution available on the basis of the epistemological means at 
hand. From the beginning of the 16th century universalism and the vision of a cosmopolitan order 
were strictly related to the conviction that a law can be detected which corresponds to the com-
mandments of reason and is valid, therefore, for the whole community of humankind. The de-
pendence of the conception of universal order from the centrality of natural reason and law was 
perfectly expressed in 1612 by Francisco Suarez in his De legibus ac Deo legislatore. Having speci-
fied, first that “jus gentium and natural law agree … in that both are in a sense common to all 
mankind,”41 and, second, that natural and jus gentium differ, nevertheless, insofar as the latter 
does not derive only from reason, but is “human and positive” law,42 he adds a very illuminating 
passage: 
 
The rational basis … of this phase of law [of the jus gentium] consists in the fact that the human race, into how-
soever many different peoples and kingdoms it may be divided, always preserves a certain unity, not only as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
theless assumed to be also by Dante as lastly inferior to that of the pope because of the intrinsically inferior na-
ture of mundane things if compared to spiritual matters (ib., Book III). 
37  The phrase is generally attributed to Baldus de Ubaldi, but can be traced back, in fact, to earlier authors. See: 
Jean Rivière, Sur l’origine del la formule juridique: “Rex imperator in regno suo”, in: 4 Revue des Sciences Reli-
gieuses 580 (1924). 
38  For the last – but very radical and, unfortunately, highly influential – expression of this theory, see: Juan López de 
Palacios Rubios, El Requerimiento (1513), in: 
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/El_Requerimiento_by_Juan_Lopez_de_Palacios_Rubios_1513 ((accessed 
10 September 2015). 
39  Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et De Jure Belli Relectiones, Oceana, New York/London 1964, Section II, 1 et seq.. 
40  Ib., Section II, 3 et seq. 
41  Francisco Suarez, De legibus, ac Deo legislatore (1612), in: Francisco Suarez, Selections from three Works, Claren-
don Press, Oxford 1944, Book II, Chapter XIX, 1, at 341. 
42  Ib., Book II, Chapter XIX, 3, at 343. 
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species, but also a moral and political unity (as it were) enjoined by the natural precepts of mutual love and 
mercy; a precept which applies to all, even to strangers of every nation.43  
 
The ontological basis of natural law, on which the universal rules of interaction are rationally 
based, is therefore located in the borderless community of humankind. This has been a topos of 
the philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries, which can be found – with only marginal differences 
– in authors very distant from each other in many other aspects, like Johannes Althusius,44 Al-
berico Gentili,45 Hugo Grotius,46 Samuel Pufendorf,47 and Christian Wolff.48 Following the theolog-
ical tradition of the Middle Ages,49 Catholic authors like Vitoria50 and Suarez51 still believed that 
human beings are capable, with the only help of their reason, to detect the derivation of natural 
law from the law of God. On the contrary, Protestant philosophers assumed that original sin made 
humans unfit to understand by means of reason the plans of God, with the consequence that, on 
the one hand, only faith can bring humans, as natural-born sinners, nearer to God’s commands, 
and, on the other, that natural reason has to develop a specific methodology to discover its own 
truth,52 independently of what God’s plans may be. However, this distinction makes no difference 
as regards the conviction – common to both Catholics and Protestants – first, that order is univer-
sal; secondly, that universal order is a command of natural law and reason; and, thirdly, that it is 
based on the borderless community of humans. 
The second change that happened at the beginning of the 16th century was the consequence 
of the discovery of the American continent and of its colonization. The questions that arose, then, 
were whether the occupation of the overseas territory could be justified and, if so, on the basis of 
which arguments. Lastly, almost the entire debate was about defending invasion, and just a few 
raised their voices against it.53 Yet, a quite relevant difference can be detected. While some au-
thors explicitly endorsed the invasion of the New World by invoking the presumed superiority of 
the European peoples,54 some others sought to maintain a presumably universalistic approach by 
giving an unprecedented legal and philosophical reach to the concept of hospitality.55 This notion 
was not new, but had been regarded, up to that time, rather as a private virtue than as a corner-
stone of worldwide order. Surely, the new centrality of hospitality may be seen – with some good 
                                                          
43  Ib., Book II, Chapter XIX, 3, at 348. 
44  On Althusius’ concept of corpus consociationis universalis see: J. Althusius, Politica methodice digesta (1614), 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Ma.) 1932, Chapter IX, No. 22, 92. 
45  Alberico Gentili, De jure belli libri tres (1612), Clatendon Press, Oxford 1933, Book I, Chapter XV, at 107. 
46  Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (1625) [The Rights of War and Peace], ed. By Richard Tuck, Liberty Fund, Indi-
anapolis 2005, “Prolegomena”, t 1747 et seq. 
47  Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo (1672), Hein, Buffalo (NY) 1995, Book II, Chapter II, No. 
VII; Book II, Chapter III, No. XV; Book VIII, Chapter VI ff.; Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis libri duo 
(1673), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 1927, Book I, Chapter VIII. 
48  Christian Wolff, Institutiones juris naturae et gentium, Halle/Magdeburg 1750, Book IX, Chapter I, No. V. 
49  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, supra note 35, Part II, Section I, Question 91, Article 2. 
50  Francisco de Vitoria, De potestate papae et concilii, in: Francisco de Vitoria, Relecciones Teológicas, Luis G. Alonso 
Getino ed., La Rafa, Madrid 1934, II, at 216; Francisco de Vitoria, De eo, ad quod tenetur homo, cum primum venit 
ad usum rationis, in: Francisco de Vitoria, Vorlesungen, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1997, II, at 158 et seq. 
51  Suarez, De legibus, supra note 41, Book II, Chapter IV, 9, at 176. 
52  Gentili, , De jure belli libri, supra note 45, Book I, Chapter I, at 10; Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, supra note 46, 
Book I, Chapter I, X, at 150 et seq., in particular: 5, at 155 et seq. 
53  The most prominent among them was that of Bartolomé de Las Casas. See: Bartolomé de Las Casa, 1563, Trata-
do de las doce dudas, German transl. in: Bartolomé de Las Casas, Werkauswahl, Mariano Delgado ed., Schöningh, 
Paderborn 1996, Vol. 3/2, II, 8, at 291; II, 26, at 346 et seq. 
54  See: John Major, In secundum librum sententiarum (1510), 2nd ed. Paris 1519; Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, De justis 
belli causis apud indos (1544–1545), Fondo de Cultura economica, Mexico 1941. 
55  For a reconstruction of the history of the concept of “hospitality” in modern political philosophy, see: Georg Ca-
vallar, The Rights of Strangers, Ashgate, Aldershot 2002. 
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reasons – mainly as the outcome of a hypocritical attitude. Nevertheless, the link that was estab-
lished hereby between the universality of natural law and hospitality can be inspiring up to the 
present day.  
The first and most outstanding advocate of hospitality in modern philosophy was Francisco 
de Vitoria. In his Relectio prior de Indis recenter inventiis of 1538/39, he analyzed, first, the illegit-
imate titles for the submission of the American aborigines by the Spaniards,56 then those which he 
maintained to be legitimate.57 Among the latter, a most prominent place was given to what Vitoria 
called the “natural society and communication” (naturalis societas et communicatio), on which the 
first legitimate title of the Spanish dominion is grounded.58 By the concept of naturalis societas et 
communicatio is meant that all human beings build a worldwide society based on their natural ca-
pability to communicate and interact with each other. As a result, everyone is entitled to travel to 
the land of his/her choice, where he/she believes that an improvement of his/her life conditions 
can be achieved, and settle down there, provided that no harm is done to the natives. In the case 
that the native inhabitants of those territories would oppose the entitlements of the newcomers – 
Vitoria adds – these latter would have the right to wage war on the natives and even submit them.  
Vitoria’s theory ends up being, actually, a justification of the conquest for at least three rea-
sons. First, the right to travel can only be seen as just if reciprocity is guaranteed; yet, what Euro-
peans can do in the Americas cannot be done by Native Americans in Europe. Secondly, insofar as 
common property is not recognized, the lands of the natives are simply regarded as res nullius 
and, therefore, rightfully seized.59 Thirdly, the duty of hospitality is not thought, primarily, to pro-
tect the persecuted, but to make the settlement of foreigners rightful. However, while the duty of 
hospitality should be seen as unrestricted only for those in life-threatening conditions, good argu-
ments speak for some kind of restraints for other travellers, for instance the consent given by the 
native inhabitants, or the protection of the identity of the existing political community. Since Vito-
ria does not address these questions, the universality of his worldwide community of humankind 
turns out to be, lastly, a quite useful basis for colonialism and imperialism.60 Nevertheless and re-
gardless of all its biases, Vitoria’s theory of hospitality contains some elements which are highly 
forward-oriented even from today’s perspective. He was, for example, an early and uncompromis-
ing defender of the jus soli.61 Furthermore, he rejected the expulsion of “strangers who have 
committed no fault,”62 thus implicitly opposing the practice of refoulement. And his plea for an 
unrestricted right to immigration grounded on the common belonging to the universal community 
of humankind may deliver some useful arguments to those who radically oppose the rightfulness 
of any defence of parochial and particularistic identities. Lastly, even the supporters of free trade 
can find in Vitoria an intriguing anticipation of their position.63 
Due to Vitoria’s contribution, the right – and duty – to hospitality became an essential com-
ponent of the modern idea of international order as well as of the emerging jus gentium. Howev-
er, some authors who took on his intuition also introduced important changes and specifications. 
The first was Hugo Grotius. Being, as a Dutch philosopher, far more sensitive than his Spanish pre-
decessor to the dangers that could arise for the very existence of a small political community from 
an unrestricted right to travel and settle down, he reinterpreted hospitality in a more moderate 
                                                          
56  Vitoria, De Indis, supra note 39, Section II. 
57  Ib., Section III. 
58  Ib., Section III, 1. 
59  Ib., Section III, 4. 
60  Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge/New York 2005. 
61  Vitoria, De Indis, supra note 39, Section III, 5. 
62  Ib., Section III, 1. 
63  Ib., Section III, 3. 
12 MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2016-24 
sense.64 Concretely, not all human beings, who – regardless of whether they are endangered or 
not – wish to travel and find a new territory in order to settle down, hold of the right of hospitali-
ty, but only those who are forced to flee their country: “a fixed abode – Grotius wrote – ought not 
to be refused to strangers, who being expelled from their own country, seek a retreat elsewhere: 
provided they submit to the laws of the state, and refrain from everything that might give occa-
sion to sedition.”65 In this sense, Grotius brings the concept of hospitality nearer to its most usual 
understanding in the current debate. 
A similar argumentation is formulated also in Samuel Pufendorf’s work, yet with a signifi-
cantly more negative note. While Grotius started with the positive claim that shelter should be 
guaranteed to strangers, and then introduced in a second step the limitation that those strangers 
have to be in danger and that they should not act against the rules of the hosting country, Pufen-
dorf turned the direction of the reasoning upside down. In fact, he first criticizes Vitoria for his 
idea of an unrestricted right to travel and to settle down,66 whereas he admits, then, that a duty to 
welcome foreigners has to be admitted on the basis of reciprocity,67 or in cases of persecution, 
provided that for the interests of one’s own community it is better if the strangers “are eminent 
for wealth and industry”68 and their influx does not involve great numbers.69 
A second novelty was introduced by Immanuel Kant, who explicitly contested the traditional 
idea that universalism must be based on natural law and on its assumption of an inherent human 
sociability as well as of a worldwide community of humankind. During the period between the be-
ginning of the 16th century and the end of the 18th century hospitality was regarded as derived 
from natural law, thus rather as a moral command than as a legal duty. As a result, it was seen as a 
part of the jus gentium, which was positive, but unwritten law. In short, insofar as hospitability 
should receive a legal dimension, this had to be founded on customs and purely rational consider-
ations, and not so much on positive and written legal instruments. Kant changed this perspective 
by a threefold intervention. First, he inserted the duty of hospitality into his system of public law.70 
Secondly, he affirmed explicitly that “the rational idea of a universal … union of all nations upon 
the earth … is a juridical principle, as distinguished from philanthropic or ethical principles.”71 In 
doing so, he detached universalism from that reference to natural law that characterized the ap-
proach of his predecessors.72 Thirdly − and as a consequence of the unequivocally legal frame in 
                                                          
64  Grotius’ sensitiveness for the right of political communities to identity, however, was limited to the European 
peoples. As regards native populations, on the contrary, his defence of the European occupation was probably 
even more unequivocal than Vitoria’s and lastly better suited to a “modern” form of colonialism which – carried 
out, in particular, by Protestant countries – combined a highly differentiated concept of sovereignty with a cer-
tain obfuscation of the distinction between private and public domain. See: Edward Keene, Beyond the Anar-
chical Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2002. In fact, Grotius did not justify the seizing 
of the lands of the natives by resorting, like Vitoria, to the universal right to hospitality, which entailed the enti-
tlement to settle down everywhere in the territory of one’s own choice. Rather, he achieved largely the same ef-
fect, first, by denying the rightfulness of common property, thus regarding all possessions of the natives as res 
nullius, and, second, by praising the desire to acquire private property as a noble expression of the human aim at 
improving life conditions. See: Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, supra, note 46, Book II, Chapter II, at 420 et seq. 
65  Ib., Book II, Chapter II, XVI, at 447. 
66  Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo (1672) [On the Law of Nature and Nations], Lichtfield, 
Oxford 1703, Book III, Chapter III, IX, at 193. 
67  Ib., Book III, Chapter III, IX, at 192. 
68  Ib., Book III, Chapter III, X, at 194 
69  On Pufendorf’s reservations as regards the extension of the right to hospitality, see: infra, note 99 et seq. 
70  Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (1795), in: Kant, Werkausgabe, supra note 9, 
Vol. XI, 191, “Erster Zusatz”, at 203, 223. 
71  Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), in: Kant, Werkausgabe, supra note 9, Vol. VIII, 309, § 62, at 475. 
72  Undeniably Kant was no positivist in the common sense of the word. Yet, insofar as it can be assumed that his 
political and legal philosophy contains elements of natural reason, these have to be located not into his under-
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which it was set − the idea of universal order was then expressed by the new term of jus cosmo-
politicum.73 However, the progress in the rational systematization of the duties which every hu-
man being owes to every fellow human goes along with a quite “thin” corpus of rights that should 
be recognized, in particular if compared to what was granted by Vitoria’s naturalis societas et 
communicatio. In fact, they were limited to the prohibition to treat strangers like enemies, where-
as no right of settlement is acknowledged and the specific condition of persecuted foreigners is 
not addressed.74  
Kant paved the way for a juridical understanding of universalism in which world order, if it is 
ever to be realized, should take essentially the form of a legal system that includes all peoples and 
states worldwide and the validity of which is extended on a global scale. Kant’s view was then rad-
icalized by Hans Kelsen, the most uncompromising supporter of legal universalism. Kelsen carried 
out the process of radicalization by completely deleting that political dimension of universal order 
which, along with the juridical component, was nevertheless present in Kant’s global order of 
peace and protection of essential human rights. Since in Kelsen the order of interactions bearing 
public interest is nothing else than the legal order of public law,75 also the most wide-ranging and 
inclusive level of interactions bearing public interest, namely the level of interactions that are reg-
ulated by international law, cannot but be a system of laws for the guarantee of peace and the 
protection of essential human rights. Furthermore, Kelsen combines his uncompromisingly innova-
tive legal conception of universalism with a rather traditional feature of this understanding of or-
der, namely with the marginalization of the role of the individual political community, in particular 
of the state as its most significant expression. In this case too, Kelsen’s approach to the question is 
utterly radical. Indeed, not only international law is explicitly put at the apex of the legal system,76 
but the individual state is also reduced to being the mere executor of what is permitted by inter-
national law within a certain territory.77 Therefore, if Kelsen’s universalism, on the one hand, 
leaves definitively the foggy lands of natural law, on the other it seems to forget that order, to be 
accepted, needs a robust legitimacy, and that this legitimacy is deeply connected to the processes 




3. Building Bridges 
 
Particularism and universalism stand traditionally against each other – with significant conse-
quences for the attitudes towards migrants. For the supporters of particularism, the gate should 
stay closed for the most time and in the most cases, being opened only if the influx of immigrants 
is in the reasonable interest of the hosting community. On the other hand, universalists either de-
ny that any good reason could be given for gates and borders to exist, or at least claim that these 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
standing of the legal system – which is completely positivized – but into the relationship between the legal sys-
tem and practical reason as a whole, the highest command of which consists in guaranteeing moral autonomy to 
the individuals. 
73  See: supra note 70 and 71. 
74  Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, supra note 70, “Dritter Definitivartikel”, at 213; Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, supra no-
te 71, § 62, at 475 et seq.  
75  Hans Kelsen, Gott und Staat (1923), in: Hans Kelsen, Staat und Naturrecht. Aufsätze zur Ideologiekritik, Ernst To-
pitsch ed., Fink, München 1989 (1st ed. 1964), 29, at 54; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, Deuticke, Leipzig/Wien 
1934, VIII, 46 et seq., at 116 et seq. 
76  Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (1920), Scientia, Aalen 1981; Kelsen, 
Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 75, IX, 50, g), at 140 et seq. 
77  Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 75, IX, 50, g), at 149 et seq.; Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law, University of 
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1944, I, 8, at 35. 
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gates and borders should be porous, regardless of the possible cost that one’s own community 
would come to bear, in order to let those fellow humans in who fear for their lives and safety. 
Yet, the arguments of both sides show weaknesses. Starting with particularism, its reaffirma-
tion of the political identity of the community – be it based on cultural and ethnic tradition, on 
egoistic interest, or simply on the existential fear of the “other”, or even on a mixture of all these 
elements – is bought at a very high price. This regards not only the violation of the moral intuition 
that the destiny of our fellow humans should not leave us indifferent, but also the inherent ration-
al inconsistency – or at least lacking of compelling evidence – of what the supporters of particular-
ism assert in order to justify their scepticism towards hospitality, or its sheer rejection. In the first 
place, the idea that rationality is inevitably and exclusively embedded in a particular cultural tradi-
tion is actually more than questionable. In fact, finding some reasonable basis for understanding 
also with those who do not originally belong to our own society belongs to day-to-day experience. 
This understanding may be sometimes difficult, or only partial, but it is – no question about this – 
possible in principle as well as in practice. Furthermore, egoistic advantage does not coincide nec-
essarily with the greatest advantage; as a result, opening the gate for immigrants may bring the 
highest long-term payoffs. Lastly, politics can be interpreted not as the struggle against the enemy, 
but as the construction of a well-ordered polis, so that nothing speaks against the involvement of 
immigrants in the edification of the common polity. 
No more compelling, however, are the claims developed by the supporters of a universalistic 
understanding of order. As shown in the former section, the idea that foreigners have a right to be 
hosted – unconditionally for some authors, only under some circumstances for others – has been 
based on one of the following assumptions: the existence or the perspective of a civitas maxima; 
principles of natural law; or a system of positive laws for the protection of peace and essential 
human rights. Yet, none of these proposals is really convincing. In fact, the civitas maxima proved 
to be unrealizable and, if conceived of as a global state, not even desirable. For their part, the 
principles of natural law took often the form of abstract commands, rather detached from the 
concreteness of political interactions and legal norms. Finally, the idea of a global legal system for 
the guarantee of peace and human rights, if considered alone, i.e. without political integration, 
lacks the necessary sensibility for the political processes that actually bring laws into existence and 
found their legitimacy. In general, traditional universalism underestimates the central pole played 
by the individual political community, with its specific and strong identity, in forging the legitimacy 
and justification of public power.  
Facing these mirror-inverted inconsistencies, some innovative exponents on both sides of 
the dichotomy began to “build bridges” towards the other shore. More concretely, they tried to 
include into the own conception some elements taken from the opposite view. In doing so, they 
showed that a rapprochement of the poles is necessary and possible.  
 
 
3.1. Extending Particularism 
 
The particularistic understanding of order tends generally to be exclusive, in the sense that the in-
dividual well-ordered social and political community does not recognize any binding force to high-
er situated rules and principles of interaction as well as that it “excludes” non-members from the 
advantages that may be derived from the order of the individual community. But does this mean 
that particularistic rationality rules out the acknowledgement of any kind of order outside one’s 
own community? Not necessarily. Indeed, particularistic thinking can recognize – under some cir-
cumstances – that alien societies display well-ordered forms of interaction, although these are al-
ways separated from one’s own structure of order and largely incommensurable with it. In this 
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case, recognition turns out to be the acknowledgement of the “different”, without any ambition to 
encompass the distinct systems of order under just one overarching dome of compelling rules and 
shared principles of interaction. In its most ambitious variant, this understanding of particularism 
can even accept that some basic principles that characterize the social interaction of one’s own 
community may be valid also for other communities, but always under the condition that the indi-
vidual identity of every community – and, thus, not universal order – is still regarded as the highest 
value. This idea of a non-exclusive particularism, with a horizontal recognition of an equal dignity 
of “other” systems of social order, but without any involvement of a vertical and multilayered 
structure of rules and principles, can be labeled as extended particularism. 
The idea of extended particularism took different shapes over the course of time. Four ap-
proaches can be identified – without claiming to be exhaustive – which share the assumption that 
a particularistic conviction does not lead necessarily to hostile confrontation with what lays out-
side the borders of one’s own community. The first approach is enlightened nationalism. Indeed, 
the exclusion of the “other” – often inciting openly the use of violence – has been an essential part 
of a very influential strand of nationalistic thinking from its very beginning at the dawn of the 19th 
century.78 Yet, the aggressive rejection of the “other” was contrasted by an alternative under-
standing of “nation”, in which the self-affirmation of the individual community did not stand nec-
essarily in contradiction with an analogous self-affirmation by other communities, but was rather 
favoured by this. The self-determination of a people goes hand in hand, here, with the same claim 
expressed by any other nation, according to a plan – attributed by some authors directly to God’s 
providence –79 in which the freedom of one improves the freedom of the others. The most rele-
vant juridical result of this conception has been the liberal international law theory after 1870, 
which “tried to balance … moderate nationalism with … liberal internationalism.”80 
The second approach of extended particularism is represented by what has been called 
“constitutional tolerance”.81 By this concept, which has been developed to describe, in particular, 
the process of European integration, the specific constitutional identity of the polity is reaffirmed 
as the bulwark of its fundamental values. Given this premise, the constitutional identity of the 
“other” is neither denied in the name of one’s own alleged superiority, nor for the sake of a higher 
located supranational system of norms. The alien should not be aggressively subdued or benevo-
lently assimilated, but simply recognized and accepted in his or her “otherness”. As a result, a plu-
rality of constitutional orders acknowledging each other in mutual respect should replace the idea 
of a top-down framework of norms and institutions. If some kind of federalism has to exist, this 
cannot and should not be realized – according to the supporters of “constitutional tolerance” – 
but in the form of a pluralism of individual constitutional identities. 
The recognition of the “other” is also at the centre of a further variant of extended particu-
larism, which originated from one of the most influential debates in the political philosophy of the 
last decades, namely from the controversy between liberals and communitarians. While liberals – 
inspired by the work of John Rawls –82 maintained that human society can only be justified, taking 
up the basis of the classical contractualist assumption, by rational decisions taken by individuals, 
communitarians assumed that without a pre-existent idea of the “good” no justice can be 
achieved. Moreover, what is “good” for a society is not thought to be, primarily, the consequence 
                                                          
78  See: supra note 15.  
79  See: Giuseppe Mazzini, Dei doveri dell’uomo, RCS, Milano 2010, at 67 et seq. 
80  Martti Koskenniemi, 2001, The Gentle Civilizer of Nation: The Rise and fall of International Law 1870–1960, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2001, at 4. 
81  Joseph H. H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg, in: Kalypso Nicolaidis, Robert Howse 
(eds.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford/New York 2001, 54–70. 
82  See: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1972.  
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of the rational exercise of free will by the political actors, but the result of a pre-rational sentiment 
of belonging, due to common experiences and education as well as shared values like the ethical 
heritage of the community.83 At first glance, it seems to be evident that while liberals tend to ad-
here to a universalistic understanding of order, communitarians are inclined towards a rather par-
ticularistic view of society. Yet, a distinction has to be made, here, which is relevant for our ques-
tion. Communitarianism presents, in fact, two different versions, one of which goes beyond short-
sighted particularism. Some communitarianists assume that the social bond that holds individuals 
together can only work if it is grounded on a strenuous and one-sided defence of the values and 
interests of one’s own community – even, and in many cases explicitly, against values and inter-
ests of other nations.84 But others, the republican communitarianists, embrace a remarkably more 
open-minded attitude. In their view, social identity does not precede intersubjective interaction, 
but is, in its essence, dialogically constituted.85 Given this premise, it cannot be ruled out, in prin-
ciple, that migrants participate in the dialogical interaction that constitutes the identity of the 
community. And, even if we should follow the communitarian perspective in assuming that this 
possibility is made difficult by the decisive influence of the different cultural backgrounds of mi-
grants and resident population, a quite evident universalistic element remains. In fact, if the iden-
tity of the community is positively understood as the result of interaction, and not negatively as 
the expression of the defence against the “other”, there is no reason why we should not welcome 
the establishment of different identities besides ours. “Everyone – therefore – should be recog-
nized for his or her unique identity.”86 The outcome is a committed plea in favour of multicultural-
ism and the politics of mutual recognition.87 
The last approach of extended particularism takes up Kant’s republicanism, yet not focussing 
at first – as usual – on the cosmopolitan dimension, but rather on the parochial origin of people’s 
self-determination. As Mortimer Sellers puts it, “people are parochial in their commitments and 
beliefs, and rightly so.”88 In fact, 
 
we live, for the most part, among our neighbours, in our home places, with local landscapes, customs, climates, 
and conventions. Much that is sweetest in life is built among human societies, according to the happenstance 
of provincial circumstances.89 
 
Yet, there is a necessity for international law in order to govern matters that cannot be regulated 
within the parochial community.90 The domain of international law, however, derives its legitima-
cy entirely from the democratic procedures established at the national level. In particular, Sellers 
assumes that the self-determination of individual human beings who create the political communi-
ty has to be understood as conceptually analogous to the self-determination of states which con-
                                                          
83  In short, communitarians focus on “the richer [than the purely deontological approach – S.D.] background lan-
guages in which we set the basis and point of the moral obligations we acknowledge” (Charles Taylor, Sources of 
the Self, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1989, at 3. 
84  Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, “The Lindley Lecture“, University of Kansas, Dept. of Philosophy, 
1984. 
85  Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in: Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton (NJ) 1994, 25, at 32 et seq. See, also: K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival, in Gutmann 
(ed.), Multiculturalism, supra note 85, 149, at 154.  
86  Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, supra note 85, at 38. 
87  Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Clarendon, Oxford 1995; Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford/New York 2001. 
88  Mortimer N. S. Sellers, Introduction, in: Mortimer N. S. Sellers (ed.), Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism, and the 
Foundations of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2012, at 1.  
89  Ib. 
90  Mortimer N. S. Sellers, Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism, and Justice, in: Sellers (ed.), Parochialism, Cosmopolitan-
ism, and the Foundations of International Law, supra note 88, 250, at 252. 
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strue the international society.91 As a result, if the decisions of the individual state arise from the 
free will of its citizens, also international law that is generated through the consent of republican 
states has to be regarded as fully legitimated.92 Consistently, the most remarkable task of the 
cosmopolitan principles consists in allowing the self-determination of peoples.93 Nevertheless, if 
the international society is made essentially of states – and only quite indirectly, and in a far dis-
tance, of politically non-situated human beings – individuals cannot but miss, in the perspective of 
republicanism, precisely that non-state-related moral and legal standing which is their only en-
dowment when any previous belonging is challenged by adverse circumstances. 
Unquestionably, these four approaches push particularism beyond its usual bounds, proving 
that it can cope with a certain – and even a relatively high – degree of openness. None of them, 
however, shows the way for a convincing overall solution of the contradiction between the right to 
refuge and political identity.94 Indeed, migrants are to be hosted and welcomed, under these 
premises, only if they can be acknowledged as members of a community bearing a different iden-
tity, or as new citizens, willing to contribute to the destiny of one’s own community. Unfortunate-
ly, migrants are in neither of these conditions: often, their identity is shaken and their community 
is lost; moreover, in many cases they are rather reluctant to engage in the life of the alien society 
in which they think to be only temporarily hosted. In their existential nakedness, they are nothing 
more – and nothing less – than fellow humans. However, it is precisely this kind of universal hu-
manity that particularism – even in its more progressive forms – misses to address. Lacking an 
epistemological tool to conceive of humans in their universal dimension and to give an adequate 
shape to their rights even beyond their cultural and political belongings,95 should we turn our 
backs on them? 
 
 
3.2. Contextualizing Universalism 
 
It did not take long until the Modern Ages’ supporters of universalism became aware of the neces-
sity to give concreteness to the rather abstract claim of a worldwide order. This happened by in-
troducing two elements: first, a higher attention towards the role played by the individual political 
communities; and, second, a certain limitation of the right to travel freely and to settle down in 
foreign countries. Both aspects aim at a contextualization of universalism. 
As regards the sensibility to the individual identity of states, two authors deserve to be re-
called for the outstandingly innovative character of their proposals. The first is Francisco Suarez, 
who developed a remarkably differentiated conception of the legal system, in which the norma-
tively higher layer of universalistic norms – represented by the lex divina, the lex naturalis and the 
jus gentium – is counterbalanced by the individuality of the leges civiles of the different states.96 
The second groundbreaking author is Kant who not only – as already mentioned before –97 gave to 
                                                          
91  Ib., at 254. 
92  Mortimer N. S. Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006. 
93  Sellers, Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism, and Justice, supra note 90, at 271 et seq. 
94  This comes in addition to some problems which affect – according to many interpreters – the very fundament of 
the particularistic conception of society, such as the narrow horizon of an idea of society in which the “good” al-
ways prevails over the “just”, as well as the contestable assumption that personal identity essentially depends on 
cultural heritage (and far less on transcendental-pragmatic communication, or, on a completely different level, 
on basically emotional forms of interaction). 
95  The problem arises if the “right to have rights” is essentially linked to citizenship. See. Hannah Arendt, The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace & Company, San Diego/New York/London 1973 (1st ed. 1948), at 290 et 
seq. 
96  Suarez, De legibus, supra note 41, in particular Books I–III. 
97  See: supra, 2.2.  
18 MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2016-24 
universalism the shape of positive law, but also put all three parts of his body of public law at the 
same level of dignity and relevance. Thus, even if we admit that the jus cosmopoliticum has a 
higher normative quality because of its stronger inclusive character,98 nevertheless its relation 
with the constitutional law of the individual state is not characterized by hierarchy. In fact, state 
law has an explicit autonomy in its field of competence, and the more universalistic layers of 
norms and institutions cannot simply impose “from above” and authoritatively what is legitimate 
within the boundaries of the individual state. As a legal system, the tri-partitioned structure of 
Kant’s public law is therefore rather polyarchic, so that we can conclude to have here, to a certain 
extent, the first anticipation of a conception in which conflicts cannot be resolved by authority, 
but only by means of dialogue. Furthermore, the endowment of rights is here differentiated de-
pending on the position that the rights holder assumes within its specific context of action – con-
cretely, the context regulated by state law, or that shaped by international law. 
As far as the second aspect of the contextualization of universalism is concerned, namely the 
limitation of the influx of foreigners for the sake of the safeguard of the political identity of the in-
dividual community, the most unequivocal warning comes from Pufendorf: 
 
it seems very … absurd – he writes – to allow others an indefinite or unlimited right of travelling and of living 
amongst us, without reflecting either on their number, or on the design of their coming; whether … they intend 
only to take a short view of our country, or whether they claim a right of fixing themselves with us forever.99  
 
As a result, it is up to “every state” to “judge proper for its interest and safety.”100 Essentially, the 
duty to host strangers – in particular if they are not in dire need, or if they are incoming in so great 
numbers that the identity of the community could be put at stake – should be well balanced with 
“the community’s duty of self-preservation,”101 or, in a less ethnic and naturalistic understanding, 
with its will to preserve its own political identity. Pufendorf’s aim, in fact, is not to deny the right 
to find shelter, but rather to remind of some reasons that stand for a certain degree of cautious-
ness: in particular the dimension of the influx of strangers, as well as their motivations and inten-
tions. Some of Pufendorf’s arguments may be hardly acceptable – for instance, the reference to 
wealth and education as criteria for the favorable reception of those who are searching for refuge 
– but, in general, his plea for a cool-minded and non-ideological approach to the question should 
be born in mind also in the current debate. 
Regardless of the innovative aperçus introduced into the relation between right to refuge 
and right to political identity, the thinkers who tried to contextualize universalism eventually failed 
in their attempt to reconcile the opposites. In fact, if the two rights should be really brought near-
er, the condition is that an autonomous basis for legitimacy is recognized for each of them within 
the context of a synthetic theory, i.e. of a theory which finds a way beyond the dichotomy of uni-
versalism and particularism. Yet, precisely this goal was not reached by any of the most important 
exponents of universalism until the paradigmatic revolution that we have experienced in the last 
decades.102 One strand of them – comprehending, among many others, also Suarez and Pufendorf 
– identified the basis for universalism in the assumption of a worldwide community of humankind 
                                                          
98  This assertion is justified by the assumption that the normative quality of a system of rules and principles de-
pends – among other factors, in particular the procedures for the legitimation of norms – on its capacity to in-
clude as many members of the community of humankind as possible, in the best case all members without any 
exception. 
99  Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, supra note 69, Book III, Chapter III, IX, at 193. 
100  Ib., Book III, Chapter III, X, at 194. 
101  Cavallar, The Rights of Strangers, supra note 55, at 204. 
102  See: Sergio Dellavalle, Addressing Diversity in Post-unitary Theories of Order, GlobalTrust Working Paper No. 
05/2015, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, University of Tel Aviv, 1. 
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sharing values and interests; the other strand, to which Kant’s philosophy contributed significant-
ly, located the same basis, instead, in the rather abstract rational capacities of the individuals. In 
the first case, universalism is guaranteed by the assumption of a holistic community of all human 
beings; in the second, by the individualistic principle according to which all individuals – with no 
exceptions – possess worldwide the same endowment of rights, interests and reason. However 
different the holistic and the individualistic variants of universalism may be, they have one im-
portant point in common: they lack to identify an autonomous basis for the right to political iden-
tity. Both fundaments for the legitimacy of social and political norms and institutions, which have 
been laid down by the two strands of universalistic thinking – i.e. the assumption of a community 
of humankind sharing an essential set of common values and interests on the one hand, and the 
transcendental conception of the abstract individuality on the other – are rather tailored, in fact, 
for the justification of the creation of a worldwide social, legal and institutional system. Within this 
horizon, instead, the defence of the political identity of the single community remains just acces-
sory. Concretely, if the essence of social life is the worldwide community of human beings, the 
identity of the single community will be only justified insofar as it fits into the broader framework. 
And, on the contrary, if the essence is the transcendental and globally rootless individual, why 
should the contract among the few to build a state have the same relevance as the much more in-




4. Beyond the Dichotomy 
 
I have presupposed, in the former Sections, that the apparent incompatibility between the right to 
seek asylum and the right to political identity is based on two elements: first, on the inherent con-
nection between the right to seek asylum and the universalistic paradigm of international order, 
on the one hand, as well as between the right to political identity and particularism on the other; 
and, second, on the dichotomous character of the relation of universalism and particularism. If 
these assumptions are correct, the outcome cannot but be that, if a way beyond the dichotomy of 
universalism and particularism is identified, also the right to seek asylum and the right to political 
identity can be possibly led to some form of conciliation. Put this way, the solution seems to be 
quite simple. In truth, however, it is not – in particular, because a possible solution runs against 
one of the most essential tenets of the traditional conception of order. 
In the whole history of political thought, order has always been conceived as something uni-
tary, regardless of the extension of what could be seen as the “well-ordered society”. In fact, this 
could be as small as the Greek polis, or as huge as the entire humankind. In any case, both the in-
stitutions and the legal system of the “well-ordered society” were represented as a coherent and 
hierarchical pyramid, thus leaving no possibility open that more than one norm could be valid  and 
more than one institution could have authority in the same place and at the same time. As a con-
sequence, also the individuals could consistently claim only one belonging – or, at least, the priori-
ty was unequivocal. In other words, one could claim to be either the citizen of a nation, or – to the 
contrary – a citizen of the world, but not both at the same time. If one did so – and we have seen 
that it was not unconceivable, at least for those universalists and particularists who were commit-
                                                          
103  As I said before, Kant did recognize autonomy to state law against international and cosmopolitan law, and no 
evident hierarchy is presumed to exist among them. Nevertheless, he failed to identify a specific ontological and 
epistemological foundation for state law, which is no less individualistically based than the other, more inclusive 
legal systems. As a result, without assuming its own ontological and epistemological basis, the autonomy of state 
law is – from a conceptual point of view – lastly groundless. 
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ted at “building bridges” towards the other side – the hierarchy between the two belongings was, 
nevertheless, more than palpable. Yet, precisely this kind of “twofold belonging” is what we need 
if we want to reach beyond the dichotomy between particularism and universalism and, therefore, 
also beyond the contradiction between the right to refuge and the right to political identity. The 
need of a step forward in the understanding of social and political belonging – away from tradi-
tional monism, and towards new forms of pluralism – has been outlined through innovative con-
cepts like “multiple demoi”104 and “dual democracy”.105  
It is rather evident that the introduction of this kind of new concepts implies a deep-going 
re-adjustment of the old categories of “social order” and “social belonging” – downright a para-
digmatic revolution in the way how the “well-ordered society” is conceived. But, concretely, how 
is the ontological foundation of the transition from a single belonging to multiple belongings to be 
understood? Or, put differently, what are the essential theoretical features of an idea of society in 
which the individual can be at the same time – and without hierarchical priority – citizen of a spe-
cific polity, and member of the global community of humans? The challenge can be successfully 
met if we accept three conceptual presuppositions. First, society has to be conceived of as made 
of a plurality of contexts of interaction. As examples, we can recall the interactions that we have in 
our neighbourhood, within the community with which we share a common cultural heritage or re-
ligious beliefs, in the political arena, or with every human being we may meet in our life.106 Two 
contexts of interaction, among many others, are relevant for our research: the interaction among 
citizens, and that involving any possible fellow human in her or his essential quality as a human be-
ing, without any further endowments like citizenship and the like. No doubt can arise about the 
fact that we interact with our fellow citizens. But the interaction with any other human being is 
hardly questionable as well, even less in times of increasing exchanges of material and immaterial 
goods all over the globe, as well as of growing migration. 
The second presupposition is that each interaction is rationally structured by resorting to 
specific discourses, each of them characterized by an issue – or by a question – around which 
communication develops. In other words, within each context of interaction, the discursive com-
munication that gives rational shape to interaction unfolds by resorting to a special question, 
which distinguishes that specific context from any other. Considering, now, the interactions that 
are central for our research, it is therefore eminently important to clarify what are the questions 
that shape the discourses concerning, respectively, the interaction between fellow citizens, on the 
one hand, and that between human beings in general on the other. On the whole, we can assume 
that the question that characterizes the discourse about citizenship – and with fellow citizens – is 
about how we conceive the idea of a “good life” in political terms. Here, a specification has to be 
introduced. In religious terms, a “life” may be regarded as “good” if it is guided by values that re-
spect what are assumed to be the commands of God. In existential terms, we lead a “good life” in-
sofar as we are able to give some sense to our existence. The questions addressed are different, 
however, if we consider the definition of a “good life” from the political perspective. The discourse 
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that shapes the interaction, here, is not about giving an existential sense to our lives, but rather 
about how to organize justifiable answers to problems of common concern, i.e. to problems which 
involve all individuals living within a specific territory. In particular, for the sake of all those who 
share the membership of a political community, some questions are necessarily to be addressed: 
for instance, the level of taxation; the organization of public administration and justice; health and 
education systems; the provisions for children, young mothers, and elderly; the spheres of repro-
duction, matrimony and, in general, sexual relations; the rules concerning the transmission of 
property and estate; and, last but not least, the legitimation of public power. The discourses that 
present arguments in favour of one preference or the other as regards these fields are to be con-
sidered political in essence.  
Political discourses must be clearly distinguished from those which address issues concern-
ing our interaction with human beings who are not fellow citizens. In this case, at the centre of the 
discourses are not the topics mentioned above, but what we necessarily owe to every human be-
ing for the mere reason of our shared humanity. Fundamentally, we are able to meet every human 
being with due respect for our shared humanity if we guarantee peace and the safeguard of es-
sential human rights. Therefore, discourses addressing the conditions for peace and the respect of 
human rights are those which are specifically to be located within the cosmopolitan horizon. In 
their essence, they are moral discourses at first, due to the universal character of their content 
and scope, but involve a legal dimension as well, insofar as they influence the creation of legal 
norms, and a political aspect when it comes to specify which institutions have the task to imple-
ment them. 
The third presupposition that has to be assumed in order to overcome the conflict between 
the right to refuge and the right to political identity maintains that different contexts of interaction 
can coexist, just like the discourses that shape the interaction on the basis of arguments. Indeed, 
we are involved at the same time in all interactions I mentioned above – with our neighbours, with 
the members of our cultural or religious community, with our fellow citizens, and with all human 
beings – and even in many more. Furthermore, we also participate in different discourses, or ex-
changes of arguments, the aim of which is to define contents and purposes of those interactions. 
Due to the simultaneous and parallel presence of a plurality of contexts of interaction and of dis-
courses, it is necessary, nevertheless, that we identify clearly in which context of interaction we 
are acting, as well as the issue and purposes of the discourse which we are currently carrying out. 
Otherwise, if we misunderstand the context of interaction in which we are presently involved, the 
consequence may be that we address the issues emerging from it with the wrong arguments. For 
example, we could discuss questions concerning our duties towards fellow humans resorting to 
the same criteria that we adopt when it comes to citizens’ rights – and vice versa – although condi-
tions and rights of the involved may be quite different. The result is a sense of confusion and a de-
bate which is twisted and mixed up by either one-sided universalistic, or no less one-sided particu-
laristic biases – quite precisely the situation we are currently experiencing.  
If we accept the three presuppositions I have just mentioned, the most important conse-
quence that we can draw is that the contradiction between universalism and particularism is no 
longer to be regarded as an inescapable condition. To the contrary, it is consistent to be universal-
ists as fellow humans, and particularists as fellow citizens. Moreover, we can accept to have 
stronger and more deep-going duties towards the members of our political community – or, with 
the words of Thomas Nagel, an “associative obligation” towards “those with whom we stand in a 
strong political relation”107 – without denying hereby our commitment towards global citizen-
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ship.108 The condition that must be met – admittedly, one that requires a lot of sensitivity – is only 
to distinguish clearly between the issues of citizenship and the discourse which defines them, on 
the one hand, and discourses and practices aiming at the worldwide protection of human rights on 
the other. On the basis of this readjustment of the conceptual framework, we can go back to the 
fundamental questions raised at the end of the introduction, starting with the first of them, name-
ly: what are the justifiable specific rights of citizens that make them different from aliens? Indeed, 
no doubts can be raised on the fact that being born within a specific political and social community 
is completely accidental, so that no difference should be made, on this account, between citizens 
and non-citizens. Yet, the consequences of the accidental fact of being born in a certain country 
are by far not as ethically neutral as the fact itself. In particular, although our initial belonging may 
be fortuitous, the circumstance of being raised within the horizon of values of a specific society 
makes of us – more or less consciously – members of precisely that community. The condition of 
particular belonging has two dimensions, the first of which consists in the participation in the polit-
ical interaction with the purpose of determining the way how common concerns are addressed. 
Surely, in traditional societies this participation is rather passive, whereas within a democratic in-
stitutional framework the contribution by the individuals is expected to be active and reflexive. In 
any case, the specific way to address political questions that characterizes a particular society nec-
essarily requires, in order to survive, a support – an implicit one, at least – by the citizens (or the 
subjects). And, since the problems addressed by political means are, case by case, the questions of 
a specific society, the individuals involved in the political discourse cannot but be the members of 
that society – and no one else.109 On the basis of this involvement we can justify the exclusive po-
litical rights of citizens. Furthermore, given that democratic institutions require – and allow – a 
higher level of participation, it is even more important for democracies to clarify who is entitled to 
be politically involved, and who is not: due to the connection between democratic self-governance 
and territorial representation, we have to assume that territorial closure is essential for democrat-
ic legitimacy.110 
Political rights, however, are not the only ones which belong to citizens, and, in general, only 
to them. Also some social rights may be exclusive as well. In fact, the accidental circumstance of 
being born into a society transforms individuals into members of a social bond. Within this bond 
we may expect more solidarity than from outside – for the simple reason that we are willing to 
guarantee the same level of solidarity to the other members – and we are disposed to a more sub-
stantial redistribution of resources. Certainly, the safeguard of social rights and the benefits that 
can be derived from them are hugely different from one country to the other. But inequalities, in-
sofar as they are not depending on past or present external interventions leading to exploitation, 
are generally based on a kind of social contract that distinguishes a specific society from any other. 
In other words, how many resources are spent on health care, social security, or education of the 
disadvantaged, builds upon the specific agreement between distinct social groups and interests in 
that particular society, as well as on what every citizen was and is disposed to give for the com-
mon welfare. The balance between social groups – always endangered by selfish interests –  and 
the quality of the provisions may be easily endangered by a dramatic influx of migrants who never 
contributed to the charges deriving from the agreement. An unrestricted right to immigration 
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would put all immigrants in the condition of being full members of the hosting society, with the 
entire endowment of political and social rights. Hence, given that political rights and some social 
rights are owned only by citizens, we are justifiably entitled to deny unlimited entry to non-
citizens. However, we have also to take into account that individuals who have been born into an 
authoritarian or unjust society are not responsible for their fate. The answer cannot consist, nev-
ertheless, in opening indistinctively all gates of the democratic and more affluent societies, but in 
supporting generous projects for the development of the living conditions in the countries of 
origin of the would-be immigrants, as well as in allowing the entry of a sustainable number of im-
migrants on yearly basis.111 In this context, the one-sided preference for the admission of skilled 
and well-educated individuals112 is morally justifiable only under the condition that their immigra-
tion can be of benefit for both the immigrants themselves and the society they are leaving. Oth-
erwise, more fair-minded criteria should be preferred.  
If it is justifiable that citizens have different (and more) rights if compared to non-citizens – 
and that we have different duties towards them – then we can maintain that only a weak right to 
free immigration exists, and, thus, no right to settle down in the country of one’s own choice. On 
the other hand, however, a strong right to immigration must be assumed for specific reasons.113 
On this basis, we can turn to the second and the third question which have been posed at the end 
of the introduction, namely: under which conditions can a right to refuge be claimed? And, what is 
entailed in the right to refuge? As for the conditions, it is reasonable to assert that individuals have 
a strong right to immigrate if their “current state of residence is unable or unwilling to adequately 
protect [their] human rights”.114 In other words, given that the conditions for interaction and mu-
tual recognition among fellow humans require the protection of life and the safeguard of essential 
human rights, then we have the duty to protect the life of individuals and social groups when they 
are in danger and their essential rights are systematically violated. In order to manage properly 
the influx of migrants, we are allowed to try to protect them in their own countries, for example 
by establishing no-flying zones and safe harbours in case of armed conflicts, or by guaranteeing 
decent life conditions in the event of natural disasters or in regions hit by dire poverty. Yet, if 
these measures prove to be inefficient, no other solution is morally justifiable but to open our 
gates and let them in. In this last circumstance, immigrants are not entitled, in principle, to be-
come full-fledged citizens because it is assumed that their stay is only temporary. Nonetheless, 
since it is morally untenable to have a two-level society, with people living under the same condi-
tions but endowed with different rights, also the temporary migrants must have full access to edu-
cation and unrestricted healthcare from the very beginning of their stay. Moreover, if their so-
journ turns out to last for a longer period than expected, we must recognize to them a right to be-
come fellow citizens and, thus, full members of our society – possibly by giving them priority, in 
the process of naturalization, over other candidates. 
Against the background of our absolute duties towards all fellow humans, the question re-
mains on whether it is justified to deny the permission to cross borders in the name of the integri-
ty of the political community – and, if so, when. While addressing this issue, Liav Orgad has recent-
ly taken on the argument that the political community has a “duty to exist”.115 I do not believe 
that this is a promising approach. Indeed, the impulse towards self-preservation was regarded as 
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essential by many political philosophers.116 Yet, an “impulse” is by no means a “duty”. Further-
more, the impulse is essentially related to individual living beings, and not to collective entity. 
Therefore, an unqualified transposition of the concept from the individual level, for which it was 
conceived, to the collective always entails the risk of a conceptual fallacy. Collective entities, in 
short, do not have autonomous will. Nonetheless, members of a society may have, as individuals, 
a reflexive will to protect the form of social and political interaction that they have realized in their 
country. And it is intellectually hypocritical to deny that a huge influx of migrants from different 
political and social traditions can be – and probably is – a relevant challenge to the established 
way of life of a country. Surely, no Western society is on the verge to disappear, so that the 
spreading fears are highly exaggerated.117 Nevertheless, surveys seem to confirm that descend-
ants of migrants, even in their third generation, maintain views which are astonishingly at odds 
with relevant tenets of Western societies, such as the separation between religion and the state, 
tolerance, and equality between men and women.118 We could counter the anxiety by recalling 
that no society is unchangeable in its ethical foundation and that the demos is nothing but the re-
sult of a process of self-constitution.119 Moreover, the definition of “citizens” and “aliens” is a dis-
cursive process which occurs through ongoing “democratic Iteration”.120 Yet, even if we admit that 
the contents of the idea of the common good that essentially characterizes a society are not given 
forever, at least the rules of interaction and mutual recognition, which guarantee that all partici-
pants in the process of definition of those contents are equally involved, should be preserved – 
and a society has a right to be highly sensitive as regards the protection of this fragile achievement 
of human civilization. 
In order to find a point of balance between the commitment to liberal values and openness 
and what he calls “majority rights”, Orgad has recently proposed a two-stage immigration proce-
dure.121 In a first stage – coinciding with admission – the immigrants are required to accept liberal-
democratic rules governing human behaviour. In the second step – namely in the course of the 
naturalization process – they must show a sufficient knowledge of the basic elements of the con-
stitutional system of the country whose citizenship they are applying to acquire. Furthermore – I 
would add – they should be expected to possess an adequate familiarity with the language of the 
country. The fact that those who are already in possession of the citizenship are not obliged to 
demonstrate such proficiencies may be considered, at first glance, a kind of discrimination. None-
theless, we have some reasons to assume that most citizens have interiorized, during their sociali-
zation, rules of interaction, basic institutional knowledge and language.122 Anyway, the procedures 
related to admission and naturalization should be conceived in a perfectly fair and transparent 
way, so to exclude biases and unnecessary harshness, and without any hidden thought aiming at 
preventing, as far as possible, any significant influx of strangers. 
When a politically relevant question is addressed from the normative perspective, it is al-
ways necessary to keep in mind that one thing is to specify what is morally or ethically permitted 
to do, another to spell out concretely which are the specific measures that have to be taken as a 
result of the normative horizon that has been outlined. Indeed, not only the contents of such 
measures but also the normative principles that lie at their basis are the results of ongoing discur-
sive interactions which elaborate only temporary answers, and never a definitive solution. None-
theless, what we can take for sure at the end of our inquiry is that neither the defence of political 
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identity with disregard of our cosmopolitan humanity, nor – to the contrary – a commitment to 
protect our fellow humans that ignores the relevance of the parochial, are necessary. From the 
conceptual point of view, the reconciliation of the universal and the particular is possible – and 
normatively desirable. Therefore, let us put aside the useless contraposition, and move on to find 
a way to keep on being, at the same time, committed citizens and caring human beings. 
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